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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the juvenile is accused of an offense which if committed by an adult
would be a felony.4'
Destruction of Juvenile Records
Act 561 alters the procedure for obtaining the destruction of
juvenile records. Previously, the juvenile was afforded the right to the
immediate destruction of records pertaining to matters which had
been dismissed.42 The new Act continues the prior law and provides
that persons adjudged neglected or in need of supervision and juve-
niles adjudicated delinquent as a result of committing minor criminal
acts43 can obtain the destruction of their records at any time. Prior
law also allowed any juvenile offender to obtain the destruction of his
records after two years.4 Under the new provision, a delinquent who
is unable to obtain the immediate destruction of his records may do
so five years after his final discharge, provided he was not adjudged
delinquent on the basis of a violent crime against the person.,5
Joseph Bradley Ortego
UNINSURED MOTORIST PROTECTION
Uninsured motorist (UM) insurance is designed to protect the
insured from injury by an automobile not covered by liability insur-
ance.' In effect, it insures against a tortfeasor's lack of insurance.2 A
41. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE,
STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS 34-35 (1966), which recommends that the
child be accused of a felony before jurisdiction is waived. See also MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27.3178 (598.4) (1944).
42. LA. R.S. 13:1586.1 (1950).
43. The Act includes the following within the non-exclusive enumeration of minor
criminal acts: simple criminal damage to property, criminal mischief, criminal tres-
pass, theft where the misappropriation or taking amounts to a value less than one
hundred dollars, receiving stolen things when the value of the thing is less than one
hundred dollars, unauthorized use of movables. La. Acts 1974, No. 561, amending LA.
R.S. 13:1586.1(E) (Supp. 1972).
44. LA. R.S. 13:1586.1(F) (Supp. 1972). Prior to the change, Louisiana's two year
period was one of the shortest in the country.
45. Violent crimes against the person include first degree murder, manslaughter,
negligent homicide, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, aggravated rape, simple
rape, aggravated kidnapping, armed robbery and extortion. La. Acts 1974, No. 561,
amending LA. R.S. 13:1586.1(F) (Supp. 1972).
1. UM insurance is not to be confused with "no-fault" insurance in force in other
states. Under UM insurance, the insured recovers from his own insurer, but fault is
still an important issue. Thus, the insured must establish the legal liability of the
uninsured motorist to recover under the UM provisions of his own policy.
2. I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILrrY INSURANCE § 17.01 (1974).
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plan of compulsory UM protection, adopted by the Louisiana legisla-
ture in 1962,1 required automobile liability insurers to issue UM
coverage of not less than $5,000/$10,000, unless the insured chose to
reject such coverage.' The term "uninsured motor vehicle" was de-
fined to include not only a motor vehicle with no liability insurance
but also an insured vehicle for which the liability insurer was insol-
vent.5 A 1972 amendment expanded the definition of "uninsured
motor vehicle" to include a vehicle with liability coverage less than
the UM coverage carried by the insured, thus allowing the insured to
recover the difference between the underinsured tortfeasor's liability
limits and his own injuries up to his UM limits.' The amendment also
expanded UM protection by permitting the insured to increase UM
limits up to the amount of liability insurance carried under the pol-
icy. 7 Act 154 of 19741 further expands UM protection by imposing an
3. Louisiana's uninsured motorist statute, LA. R.S. 22:1406(D) (Supp. 1962), was
adopted by Act 187 of 1962.
4. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1) (Supp. 1962) (as it appeared before 1972). This statute
required the insurer to issue UM coverage "in not less than the limits described in the
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law. . ." found in LA. R.S. 32:900 (Supp. 1962),
which requires a minimum coverage of $5,000/$10,000.
5. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D) (2) (Supp. 1962) (as it appeared before 1972).
6. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(2) (Supp. 1962), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 137 § 1
(as it appeared before Act 154 of 1974).
7. Id. § 1406(D)(1)(b).
8. La. Acts 1974, No. 154 § 1 amends and reenacts paragraphs (1) and (2)(b) of
R.S. 22:1406(D) as follows:
"D. (1) No automobile liability insurance . . . shall be delivered or issued for
delivery . . . unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not
less than the limits of bodily injury liability provided by the policy . . . for the
protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover dam-
ages from owners or operators of uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles...
provided, however, that the coverage required under this section shall not be
applicable where any insured named in the policy shall reject the coverage or
select lower limits.
(2)(b) For purposes of this coverage the term uninsured motor vehicle shall ...
also be deemed to include an insured motor vehicle when the automobile liability
insurance coverage on such vehicle is less than the amount of damages suffered
by an insured and/or the passengers in the insured's vehicle at the time of an
accident .. "
Act 154 became effective at twelve o'clock noon on July 31, 1974, and any policy
written or renewed subsequent to that date must provide the extended UM coverage
required, even if the insurer failed to discuss the additional coverage with the insured
and did not receive additional premium payment for it. One may assert that Act 154
will apply to all policies in effect as of July 31, 1974. However, the Act specifically
states that no policy "shall be delivered or issued for delivery" without the additional
UM coverage. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1) (Supp. 1962), as amended by La. Acts 1974, No.
154 § 1 (emphasis added). Hence, the 1974 amendment can have no effect on policies
written prior to July 31, 1974. In Doucet v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 302 So. 2d 731
19751
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affirmative duty on the insurer to provide UM coverage at least equal
to the limits of bodily injury liability (BI) provided by the policy,
unless the insured chooses to reject this coverage or selects lower UM
limits.' The definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" was also changed
to include an insured motor vehicle with liability coverage which is
less than the amount of damages which the injured insured or his
passengers are entitled to recover. "
The change in the definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" is
important because all the insured must now establish is that the
damages he has suffered are greater than the liability limits of the
tortfeasor. In effect, UM coverage is now excess coverage over the
tortfeasor's BI liability limits and no longer operates as an absolute
limit of recovery. For example, if a plaintiff proved damages of $8,000
and had $5,000 UM coverage and his tortfeasor had BI limits of
$5,000, there could be no recovery under either the 1962 statute or the
1972 statute. Assuming the tortfeasor's insurer was solvent, the plain-
tiff would be denied recovery under Act 187 of 1962 merely because
the tortfeasor was in fact insured. Recovery would also be denied
under the 1972 amendment because the tortfeasor's BI liability cover-
age was not less than the plaintiffs UM coverage. However, recovery
of $3,000 will be allowed the insured under the 1974 amendment
because this amount is the difference between the insured's damages
and the BI limits of the tortfeasor. Added to the $5,000 BI coverage
received from the tortfeasor's insurer, the UM recovery will thus fully
compensate the plaintiff."
One issue raised by the passage of Act 154 is its effect on "stack-
ing," first allowed in Louisiana in 1972 in the cases of Graham v.
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), plaintiff's contention that Act 154 should apply retrospectively
because it is remedial or curative in nature was found to be without merit, since the
Act was deemed to be a broadening of coverage by the Louisiana legislature.
9. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1) (Supp. 1962), as amended by La. Acts 1974, No. 154 § 1.
While many states require rejection of UM coverage to be in writing, the new Louisiana
statute makes no specific mention of the procedure; thus, oral waivers may be valid.
However, to avoid needless litigation the insurer should require a written waiver of the
UM limits. Information Letter No. 7 from H. P. Walker, Administrator of the Louis-
iana Insurance Rating Commission, to all insurers licensed to write property, casualty
and surety insurance in Louisiana, October 4, 1974, at p. 2.
10. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(2) (Supp. 1962), as amended by La. Acts 1974, No. 154
§ 1.
11. See Doucet v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 302 So. 2d 731 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974),
where recovery was denied on a UM policy covering the vehicle in which plaintiffs were
guest passengers, because the UM coverage was equal to the tortfeasor's BI coverage.
The court admitted that recovery would have been justified under the 1974 Act, but
because the accident occurred in 1973, Act 137 of 1972 was the applicable law.
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American Casualty Co.' 2 and Deane v. McGee. 3 "Stacking" is the
practice of allowing the insured to recover under each insurance pol-
icy up to its limits when there are two or more applicable policies, or
up to the limits of the policy for each vehicle when two or more
vehicles are insured under the same policy, despite policy language
which would restrict such recoveries.' 4 In Graham, the Louisiana su-
preme court refused to enforce a "pro-rata clause"' 5 which attempted
to limit recovery to the highest applicable policy limits, to which all
policies would have contributed in proportion to their limits. In
Deane, the court also held void an "excess clause"'" which would have
restricted UM recovery under the policy to the amount the UM limits
of the policy exceeded the UM limits of any other primary policy
under which the insured could recover.'7 These results were reached
by interpreting the statutory minimum requirement as a minimum
coverage per policy and not per accident in the case of multiple ap-
plicable policies, and as minimum coverage per vehicle and not per
policy in the case of multiple vehicles covered by the same policy.
Reasoning that "pro-rata," "excess" and similar clauses'8 could result
12. 261 La. 85, 259 So. 2d 22 (1972).
13. 261 La. 686, 260 So. 2d 669 (1972).
14. For a discussion of when "stacking" may be attempted see Roberts, Uninsured
Motorist Coverage: "Stacking"; Credit for Medical Payments: Claimant's Failure to
Submit to Medical Examination, 19 LA. B. J. 211 (1971). See also Note, 33 LA. L. Rlv.
145 (1972).
15. The "pro-rata clause" in Graham stated: "[I]f the insured has other similar
insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the damages shall be
claimed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance
and such other insurance and the company shall not be liable for a greater proportion
of any loss to which this coverage applies than the limits of liability hereunder bears
to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insur-
ance." 261 La. at 91, 259 So. 2d at 24.
16. The excess clause in Deane stated: "[Tihe insurance ... shall apply only
as excess insurance over any other similar insurance available to such insured and
applicable to such automobile as primary insurance, and this insurance shall then
apply only in the amount by which the limit of liability for this coverage exceeds the
applicable limit of liability of such other insurance." 261 La. at 690, 260 So. 2d at 671.
17. See Bailes v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 123 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1971), holding a "pro-rata clause" valid prior to Graham and Deane. Before
Deane, every circuit of the Louisiana courts of appeal upheld "excess clause" provi-
sions. See, e.g., Long v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 236 So. 2d 521 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1970); Jackson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 So. 2d 621 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1970); Lott v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 223 So. 2d 492 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1969); Leblanc v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
18. "Exclusionary clauses" and "reduction clauses" have also been held void on
the basis of Graham and Deane. "Exclusionary clauses" purport to deny coverage
when the insured was injured by an uninsured motorist while occupying an owned
vehicle which is not described in the policy and/or which no premium has been paid
19751
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in a reduction of recovery on an individual policy below the statutory
minimum,'9 the courts refused to enforce them. At the same time, the
courts found nothing in the statute which prohibited recovery of more
than the statutory minimum; nor was there a prohibition from receiv-
ing the minimum from more than one insurer if the damages war-
ranted such recovery.2 0
On the basis of this jurisprudence, it would appear that "stack-
ing" is implanted in Louisiana law to allow maximum UM recovery.
However, the 1972 and 1974 amendments to the uninsured motorist
statute may provide a limit on the amount the insured may recover
through "stacking," as illustrated by the recent decision of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeal in Barbin v. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co.2 1 In Barbin, defendant insurer appealed a judgment
allowing plaintiffs to "stack" UM coverage provided under one policy
covering plaintiffs' two automobiles. Although recognizing that the
public policy underlying the Graham and Deane decisions was to hold
UM insurers "liable to the full extent required by the statutory mini-
mum provisions, ' 22 the majority in Barbin pointed to the burden
placed on UM insurers and disallowed "stacking" by seizing on lan-
guage in the 1972 amendment which required the insurer to permit
the insured to increase his UM coverage "to any amount not in excess
of the limits of the automobile liability insurance carried by such
insured. '2 Since Barbin had provided the public with protection
thereunder. The courts have held these clauses inapplicable in two situations: (1)
When the insured carried UM coverage on two or more owned vehicles, he has been
allowed to "stack" so as to recover under all the UM policies rather than only the one
covering the vehicle he was occupying when injured. See Crenwelge v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 277 So. 2d 155 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973). See also Roberie v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 291 So. 2d 923 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974); Rascoe v. Wilburn, 295
So. 2d 201 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974). (2) When the insured carried no UM coverage on
the owned vehicle he was occupying at the time of the injury but does have UM
coverage on one or more other owned vehicles, he may recover under the policies on
the other vehicles. See Elledge v. Warren, 263 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
A "reduction clause" would deduct from the recoverable amount all payments
made to the insured by the owner or operator of the uninsured automobile or by anyone
jointly or severally liable with such owner or operator as well as any workmen's com-
pensation benefits paid because of injury caused by an uninsured motorist. See Smith
v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 270 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
19. Graham v. American Cas. Ins. Co., 261 La. 85, 93-94, 259 So. 2d 22, 24-25
(1972).
20. Id. See also Deane v. McGee, 261 La. 686, 693-94, 260 So. 2d 669, 671-72
(1972).
21. 302 So. 2d 631 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ granted, 305 So. 2d 125 (1974).
22. Id. at 633.
23. Id., citing LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(b) (Supp. 1962), as amended by La. Acts
1972, No. 137 § 1 (as it appeared before Act 154 of 1974).
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from his own negligence in an amount of $5,000/$10,000 coverage, the
court reasoned that "stacking" should not be allowed to increase his
UM protection to $10,000/$20,000, because this would result in UM
limits "in excess of' the BI liability limits carried by the insured.24
Therefore, under the Barbin rule, an insured may "stack" UM cover-
age up to, but not in excess of, his BI liability coverage.2"
In dissent, Judge Frug6 noted that the language of the UM stat-
ute upon which the court relied in Graham and Deane had not been
changed by the 1972 amendment. Moreover, the language interpreted
by the majority to reach a result contrary to those cases was not
meant to limit the amount of coverage the insurer may provide but
instead mandated the amount the insurer must provide."6 According
to the dissent, the insured should be able to purchase UM coverage
over his BI limits and should therefore be allowed to "stack" over this
amount for maximum recovery.2"
Act 154 of 1974 does not contain the "not in excess of' language
of the 1972 Act, but rather requires the insurer to issue UM coverage
"in not less than the limits of bodily injury liability provided by the
policy .. .28 Such phrasing supports the theory of Judge Frug6's
dissent because the provision now unequivocably sets a minimum
rather than a maximum amount of coverage. Because of this mini-
mum coverage requirement, the rationale of Graham and Deane may
still be applicable to allow the insured to "stack" his UM coverage
up to the amount of his damages. Furthermore, the failure of the
legislature to prohibit "stacking" may be interpreted as sanctioning
the practice in order to fulfill the public policy of maximum protec-
tion against uninsured motorists. 9
24. The court stated, "This expression of legislative intent overrides the state-
ment of public policy expressed in the jurisprudence." 302 So. 2d at 631.
25. The court recognized that Barbin was in direct conflict with its recent decision
in Wilkinson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 298 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), which
allowed the plaintiff to "stack" coverage of several cars provided in a single policy. The
court stated, "We distinguish Wilkinson because the accident in that case occurred
and the policy was issued before the 1972 amendment. Here the accident occurred and
the policy was issued after the 1972 amendment." 302 So. 2d at 633.
26. Barbin v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 302 So. 2d 631, 634 (Frug6, J.,
dissenting).
27. Id.
28. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1) (Supp. 1962), as amended by La. Acts 1974, No. 154
§ 1.
29. In Elledge v. Warren, 263 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972), the Third Circuit
employed a different interpretation of uninsured motorist protection than that ex-
pressed later in Barbin. "The purpose of the statute is to protect completely, those
willing to accept its protection, from all harm, whatever their status-passenger,
driver, pedestrian-at the time of injury, produced by uninsured motorists. The only
1975]
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However, a strong policy argument in support of applying the
majority's rationale to the UM statute as amended in 1974 is that
"stacking" should no longer be permitted above the BI limits because
it could amount to undue hardship on the insurer and undue reward
to the insured. When "stacking" was first allowed in Louisiana, UM
insurers were only required to provide basic $5,000/$10,000 coverage."0
Because this coverage often proved inadequate, "stacking" was nec-
essary to allow the insured maximum recovery when injured by an
uninsured motorist. After the passage of Act 154, however, the in-
sured automatically receives UM coverage equal to the BI coverage
he acquires to protect himself from liability. It would appear inequit-
able for the insured to benefit from "stacking" when it provides him
with a greater recovery than he has offered to one to whom he may
be found liable.2 ' The basic intent of UM insurance is to provide the
insured with the protection he would have had if the accident had
been caused by an automobile covered by a standard liability policy.
32
Act 154 appears to provide this protection without "stacking."
The appropriateness of stacking under the 1972 amendment will
be decided by the Louisiana supreme court when it hears the Barbin
restrictions are that the plaintiff must be an insured, the defendant motorist unin-
sured, and that plaintiff be legally entitled to recover. We will not enlarge upon these
qualifications and restrict the coverage of such a socially desirable policy by allowing
insurance companies to pursue alleged 'business interests.'" Id. at 918-19.
30. See note 4 supra.
31. Compared to the amount of protection received, UM yearly rates are relatively
inexpensive: $7 for $5,000/$10,000 and only $40 for $100,000/$300,000 coverage. On the
other hand, BI liability yearly rates range from $30 to $61 for $5,000/$10,000 coverage
and from $54 to $110 for $100,000/$300,000 coverage, depending upon the area of the
state in which the insured resides. Insurance Services Office, Private Passenger Auto
Manual, Louisiana Section, (Rates stated in effect Oct. 1974). Thus, by means of
"stacking" not limited to the insured's BI limits, the insured with UM coverage may
recover two, three, or even more times as much from an auto insurer as a person
without UM protection, and this greater coverage is less expensive. For example, an
insured A may own two automobiles each with BI coverage of $100,000/$300,000. Under
Act 154, he would also be entitled to UM coverage of $100,000 on each auto. If A is
injured by uninsured motorist B while riding as a guest passenger in C's auto, (also
with $100,000 UM coverage), A may recover up to $300,000: $100,000 from the policy
of the auto in which he was a guest passenger and an equal amount from each of the
two policies he purchased for his own vehicles. However, if A had been at fault while
driving one of his automobiles and had injured B, B could recover only $100,000 from
A's insurance company. Any damage suffered over and above this amount would have
to be recovered from A's personal assets. The inequity is apparent. Of course, under
no circumstances will the insured be able to recover an amount greater than the actual
damages he has suffered.
32. 12 G. COUCH, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 570 (2d ed. 1964).
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case.33 Although the court's holding will not be binding under the new
law, it may indicate whether the policies underlying "stacking" are
now outweighed by increased burden on the insurer.
William G. Conly
THE PIGGYBACK STATUTE
Following the national trend of state reliance upon the federal
government for determination and collection of state income taxes,'
Act 341 of the 1974 regular session2 conforms the Louisiana state
income tax to the provisions of the United States Internal Revenue
Code. The United States Congress sanctioned this movement by the
Federal-State Tax Collection Act of 19721 which allowed federal
collection of state income tax, provided the state elected to partici-
pate in the process' and complied with other conditions outlined in
the Internal Revenue Code. Under such an unmodified plan, "piggy-
backing" significantly lessens the taxpayer's burden as he merely
completes his federal return and the Internal Revenue Service is
allowed to deduct an appropriate portion of the tax paid for his state
income tax.' The scheme arguably facilitates more efficient adminis-
tration of state income tax laws7 and results in quicker payment of
withholding taxes to the states than do the methods currently em-
ployed.'
33. The Louisiana supreme court granted writs to hear Barbin on December 20,
1974. 305 So. 2d 125.
1. S. REP. No. 1050, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3891 (1972): "[A] significant number of
states have, of their own accord, already adopted income taxes that conform substan-
tially with Federal income tax laws." Even before the "piggyback" legislation, Louis-
iana law required a taxpayer who filed both a state and federal return to include his
federal net income in the state return. LA. R.S. 47:103(B) (1950).
2. The Act amends Chapter 1 of Title 47 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes by
adding Part I, consisting of sections 290-98.
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6361-65.
4. Id. § 6361(a).
5. Id. § 6362 outlines the conditions a state's tax laws must meet to be eligible
for the program.
6. The Internal Revenue Service returns this tax to the state under the provisions
of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 6361(c)(1), (2).
7. 0. OLDMAN & F. SCHoErrLE, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES AND FINANCE 674 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as OLDMAN & SCHOETLE]. See S. REP. No. 1050, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
3891-92 (1972). But see note 12 infra.
8. S. REP. No. 1050, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3892 (1972).
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